Introduction
As weeks gradually expand to a month, citizens’ trust & pressure on Nigerian government’s ability to
rescue the abducted young women begins to mount. What happened last week was
the climax of Abuja’s incoherence and dubious transfer of responsibility to ‘the
international community’ i.e. United States including but not limited to the
wife of the US president. Our concern in this piece is the geographical
elements or connections towards successful rescue of all the girls.
Business Case with Caveat
With Abuja’s wake up and finally
admission of slumber, a number of countries, the usual suspects, arrived the
‘scene’ ‘ready to help’ Nigeria with any resource required. Peruse the list;
United States, United Kingdom, France and Israel. This lot wouldn't bat
eyelids if the country in question produced only pawpaw. China offered to assist. Interestingly China's rise (in Nigeria/Africa) is a major factor in the usual suspects response. To perceive the depth
of Abuja’s incompetency, it was credited that the French president advised for Abuja’s consultation with neighbouring states. Even though this is class 101 in
crisis management/international relations, the hidden message is that Nigeria’s
neighbour is France, so Paris rightly called the shot from Quai d’Orsay.
Yaoundé, Ndjamena and Niamey are hardly free capitals beyond French realpolitik!
Data & Resources
It is not beyond Nigeria’s
capacity and resources to successfully rescue these sisters without foreign
assistance. Even if any is required, the legal spies from their Abuja &
Lagos embassies should be enough.
Nevertheless the question now turns to what kind of resources are needed
(by Nigeria) for the rescue operation.
Only one is most important, credible human resources including police, military
& Secret Service within an efficient system; sadly this is lacking in
Nigeria despite massive budgets running in trillions of Naira. The secondary resources include Geoinformation/Geographical
Information System (GIS) tools and sophisticated telecommunication/surveillance equipments.
Geographical data is freely
accessible on various Internet platforms such as Google, Yahoo, Yandex &
Bing. Latest Satellite data is accessible on demand and payment. First step is
opening a Google search engine and type in “Chibok” and open the map window in
composite (Earth) mode to enable vegetation, routes and terrain to focus. This
operation can be done in R or any open source platform. The caveat in this
operation is that Google maps (of Africa) are usually outdated so current or latest
detail of the previous 24 hours is only accessible through commercial
arrangement with Google, Digital Globe or any military satellite provider. With
zoom functions it is ease to ‘fly in’, ‘fly over’ and ‘fly out’ at various
resolutions to confirm Chibok ‘borders’ and surrounding. Among other things to
confirm is its isolation, its small population from counting dwellings and its
aridity from scanty vegetation. See Google map below.
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| Chibok, Borno State |
From reconnaissance it becomes
apparent that this isolated clustered town less than 50km from Cameroonian
border provides an important opportunity in that the members of the population
more or less should know one another. A major factor in these areas is the
climatic condition which is usually very hot and arid with little or no
vegetation across swathes of land. This makes for clustered settlement near
swallow water tables or rivers. The point of abduction i.e. the
secondary school is identified and marked, the data was unavailable at the time of
writing. Choosing a point as Chibok centre along the only main route, Damboa –
Mayo-Bani Road, cutting it into two, a buffer of 3km completely encloses it. Mayo
Bani is in Adamawa State. See Google map below.
 |
| Damboa - Mayo Bani Road |
From the school, where will Boko
Haram take over 200 young women to for a considerable period of time? They must
have planned their operation meticulously for successful capture and exit. If
gender and climatic conditions are the primary variables, it is difficult to
picture these girls farther away from Chibok. Even if Boko Haram possess
significant resources in vehicles, fuel, mechanics, fresh water, medical
personnel and medicine; they will not travel far. They have only 3 options
after successful abduction; travel north toward Damboa (20km), or south to
Askria (16km) & beyond or stay put in a large compound with many rooms in
Chibok. See Google map below.
 |
| Chibok - Mayo Bani Road |
My conclusion is based on among
other things; Borno State as hotspot of Boko Haram offensive, a review of sparse route network, appreciating logistics
complexity of abducting over 200 young women and scattered settlement pattern
within a 100 sq km area around Chibok i.e. Damboa – Mayo Bani quadrangle. See Google map below.
 |
| Damboa - Mayo Bani Quadrangle |
Of course there are scattered settlements in the area, nevertheless their
desire to keep the young women alive suggest that access to medical personnel,
medical care and food puts Boko Haram in an awkward position for proximity to
larger towns. Of course they possess greater local intelligence of points of
interests, terrain and hydrogeology but in no way minimises the logistical
challenge of abducting over 200 young women.
Houses Indeed
As I stated earlier over 200
young women can only be held in a large walled space with probably equal number
of (male/female) observers/punishers with clear line of sight. They will supervising
them at all times including but not limited to times of eating, bathing,
cooking, cleaning, washing, praying, and even toilet. It requires a huge outlay
of resources including waste management. Where will waste generated be dumped?
Satellite imagery will help identify change in curious object size each day
within/beyond residential wall where applicable, of course there are many
dwelling to consider.
The only reason Boko Haram may take them out
of Chibok is to minimise escape attempts implying a large walled dwelling
distant from viable road. Nevertheless walled spacious dwellings in Chibok,
Askria, Chul, Mayo Bani, Anjawa, Lassa and etc should be a priority.
Geographical Information system offers powerful tools including Zoom and
methodologies for identification and analyses in this area. There are many
walled spacious dwellings in Chibok around the ‘borders’ especially in the
north and west. See example in Google map below.
 |
| Examples of walled spacious dwelling North of Chibok |
Telecommunication
Geographical data and their
analyses alone are limited for a number of reasons. Considering the size of
study area, huge human resources requirements for monitoring, observing and
identifying potential real suspicious movements/behaviours/actions;
telecommunication tools becomes imperatives. Sophisticated listening devices
that monitor all telephone/mobile/satellite calls & their location in real
time need to be deployed, including text message and email transaction
surveillance tools. Probably this is where Abuja may have sought for assistance
which the resident embassies possess for this day-to-day work against Nigeria’s
interest. Analyses of captured intercept
call data/text messages/emails with Social Network Analytical (SNA) tools in
addition to GIS results should generate interesting results of not only Boko
Haram operatives but their sleeper supporters in high and low places
within/beyond Nigeria.
Still
For all these requirements,
tools, methods and personnel; Abuja doesn't need to compromise national
interest/security by extending open-ended invitations to those countries whose
interest in the matter run counter to Nigeria’s strategic interest. Yes, our
sisters must be returned alive with not just their dignity intact but equally
the dignity of all those who traditional and ontological homes fall within the
boundaries of the leaking umbrella called Nigeria.
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