Introduction
The recent escalation of
perpetual conflict in the Arab-Islamic world has brought usual views and
counterviews in the public domain despite the fact that none of the views
original or new. While various news media in the West vacillate between raising
prospect of Kurdish resistance and their resilience, the true outcome of the
current phase of conflict be it balkanisation of Iraq, attempted regime change
in Syria or distractive insertion of Daesh into the maelstrom remain thus; Kurds
will be betrayed and disappointed. Look back into history.
Strategic Markers
Interesting developments have
been emerging in the last few months suggesting that Arab-Islamic world
reconfiguration is reaching a critical stage. This is considered partly in view
of the current proxy regional war raging in Syria. While the players of various
dimensions are known, one player remains the weakest link. This weakness
contrasts in scope and context with post 1st Gulf War imposition of
non-fly zone over northern Iraq. At the time Iraq existed, her territorial
integrity was respected even by sanction busters. All the above mentioned evaporated with 2003
‘shock and awe’ invested by United States. The entity and concept known as Iraq
was swept into oblivion.
With such national vacuum, Iraq
Kurds perceived an opening and morphed it into an opportune advantage probably
in view of history to strategically repositioning under the umbrella of chaos
in Baghdad. But the problem is not the south, it is the neighbourhood. While Erbil saw it fit to challenge Baghdad with
Tel Aviv encouragement in illegal crude oil sales, the short-sightedness began
to unravel with the immediate difficulty for the stolen oil to be sold. This
strategic error signifies the highest realisation of Iraqi Kurdish
self-determination because they overplayed their hand. It is worrying that Erbil approached Ankara
anticipating a solid and strategic rapprochement while Erbil is not yet a
nation-state which in any event Ankara will not tolerate except with huge dose
of finlandisation.
Few weeks ago while the ‘coalitions
of the willing’ were emerging like microscopic multicellular organism to fight
the latest incursion, bear in mind that some of the coalition member possess
enough military hardware to reduce the world to ashes. Ankara demurred. With
the recent past exchange of prisoners/hostages between Ankara and Daesh, Ankara
made a Neo-Ottoman strategic gamble primarily in conflict with Kurdish
aspiration. The inglorious zero-problem policy is in tatters! In approving legal incursion into Syria, Kurdistan Worker Party
(PKK) is declared a terrorist organisation and the goal is to use Daesh to
knock at the gate of Damascus.
Military Situation in Kobani/Ayr Al Arab, Syria |
Ankara is committed to
establishing a buffer zone in this area to forestall any Syrian Kurdish
aspiration regardless of who is the victor and then advance the cause of regime
change in Damascus. Problem is Ankara is not calling the shots and also lacks
the capacity/resources to do so even with Washington DC illustrious allergy to
robust geostrategy. Damascus policy of concentrating resources in the western
part thus freeing the eastern deserts and north eastern sparse population
centres to Kurds is not received positively in Ankara. See map below. Ankara sees as potential destabilisation
strategy to link up Kurds in both countries.
Western Syria High Population Density in contrast to Eastern Desert Lands |
Population and Religious
Dynamic
Based on wider aggregation of
population, the main players in the conflict are Arabs, Turks and Kurds.
Minorities up and down the area are deemed ‘invisible’ and false flag
‘elements’ by the various powers seeking hegemony in both Syria and what is
left of Iraq. The fact that most of the Kurdish territories are coterminous
with large crude oil deposits makes it imperative for Riyadh, Ankara and other
gulf capitals to restrict any development and utility of these rich resources
by the Kurds.
With Iran contextually out of the
battlefield picture, the Kurds are spatially and numerically contained and
restricted in their ability to manoeuvre in the short and long terms. While it
remains to be seen how post-war Damascus will deal with power allocations and
political gains made during the war by Kurds, it is becoming clearer that
Syrian Kurds have an opportunity to engage fully with Damascus. Any buffer in
the northern border by Ankara will strategically cut Syrian Kurds from Turkish
Kurds in the short term. The biggest mistake Syrian Kurds will make is making an
opportunistic alliance with Ankara against Damascus. Kobani assault is making it an impossible prospect.
Maybe one of the aims of the
ill-fated air campaign strategy is to expose Syrian Kurd to accomplish Ankara’s
design because militarily the area under Kurdish population are not only
unprotected, the military capacity and resources to reverse an offensive by
Daesh or Turkish Army remains to be seen. An air campaign devoid of well resourced ground troops is
a figment of imagination and confirmation of irreversible decline of its
protagonists.
These events are not unfolding in
a vacuum. PKK has signalled its concerns and worries. It will be difficult for
Ankara to reverse the gains Kurds made in the last decade without outright
resort to total violence, repression, oppression and massacres. Whatever gain
Ankara makes in the short term at the expenses of Damascus, the political
climate in Turkey will be most difficult regarding the Kurdish question.
In addition to the devious
designs regional players, the religious template dominating the landscape is
Islam and its various denominations. The mental image dominating power brokers
and victims of war is mirrored in the binary of Shia Arab and Sunni (Arab) Muslims.
Kurds are not presented succinctly through the religious prism and at best the
presentation has acclaimed that those lands are not Christians except
foreigners on pilgrimage. Geopolitically the current religious montage seamlessly
interlocks and connects Ankara, Riyadh and the gulf capitals in a united Sunni gambit
to dominate and control the final regional outcome which sadly does Kurds of
any country no favours.
It is the case that either Kurd
raised their hopes too high and overplayed their hand or that they deliberately
tasted the dangerous geopolitical minefield.
Whichever way, evidence point to that fact the Kurds in Iraq and Syria
cannot defend themselves robustly without external intervention. There is clear
absence of capacity and capability for Kurds to seriously navigate the
geopolitical complexities of their neighbourhood, a neighbourhood that doesn't
want them. The status-quo of remaining
minorities in the different countries that encircles their nations will not be
successfully challenged in the near future. Territorially Iraqi Kurds are best
placed to explore their limited self-determination with what remains of Iraq
through proactive cooperation with Baghdad and Tehran.
Looking East & Global
South
As a people surrounded on many
levels in their territorial scales, and in addition to the unsuccessful
domination of north Atlantic geopolitics of their betrayals; Kurds of every
country should tactical commence further exploration of the contours of the
emerging geopolitical reconfiguration. This new reconfiguration is gradually
enhancing and elevating capitals in the East and in the Global South. The
fossilised and inflexible betraying policy of the West will not be productive
or generate positive results for Kurds.
The chances of a minority group
to hold power in the region similar to Syria is slim and may not be repeated.
Bahrain is hanging on but only for a short time, less than a generation at most.
The main reason for positing the view of looking East stems from the fact
various players in the region who are equally big crude suppliers are increasingly
making their profit off high demand and purchases from India and China. These capitals may never initially be
amenable but will be open to receive entreaties.
Maintaining a viable relationship
with Global South capitals and Moscow without suspicion with home governments
will encourage new confidence for future generation of Kurdish leader in a renewed
internationalisation of the Kurdish question. One of the main problems for Kurds
in the Atlantist perspective is the clear choice in a binary of interest of
which Kurdish question is relegated as an internal affairs matter. With the strategic objective of having
unfettered access to crude oil in return for non-interference on suppliers
domestic affair; the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria in descending order
were freed from comprehensively addressing the questions.
Beijing, Delhi, Brasilia and Moscow are rising
in profile. This is amplified by the continued US aggression towards their
strategic and core national interests. While the US will not collapse in one
day, her prowess is in decline on many fronts. While the difficulty of such
interaction cannot be dismissed, strategic interests and pressure from the
named capitals may be the catalyst for Kurds in every country to maximise their
self-determination to a higher extent.
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