Final Offensive – Nigeria’s End Game for Boko Haram?

Introduction
Recent past postponement of national elections by the Nigerian government was projected by Abuja as a ploy to defeat and destroy the threat posed by Boko Haram in the North East. A 6-week window is very tight to be taken seriously and maybe self-defeating for Abuja. However a number of geographic indicators may suggest contrary patterns which add to the complexity of this armed conflict. It may not necessarily be Nigeria’s conflict for a number of reasons which are explored below.

Theoretical Clarifications

The arrival of Boko Haram on the scene has thrown Nigerian elite and intelligentsia into confusion for a number of reasons. Most obvious is the sheer difficulty in putting a fitting label over time on the phenomenon.  Nevertheless there is an agreement that Boko Haram is a source of (strategic) instability with academic appreciation to its elimination. Different stakeholders have presented dynamic views over time as Boko Haram seem to have ‘settled’ down. Understanding this pattern of events requires an acknowledgement of the following;

• Boko Haram is not a standing army with conventional posture. Its operation is expressed via unconventional, asymmetrical and guerrilla warfare

• Comprehensive response to Boko Haram will be enhanced with huge intelligence operation

• Boko Haram has international remit and an outcome of a deliberate 'western' geopolitical investment with sustainable supply/reinforcement operation

• Boko Haram has a time line allocated to it by its sponsors/handlers

• Boko Haram exploits territorial trap or conditioning of its target (countries)

Complicated Threat

One of the most serious items overlooked by analysts in dissecting Boko Haram is the sheer ignorance of their or imposed motivations. Why will an armed group commence operation in a sparsely populated Savannah/arid vegetation zone with no access to the sea? Why is an armed group successfully navigating is operation in a location of small towns with depressed economies? There are no easy answers to both questions but an attempt will be made to delineate possible linkages between states weakness, Boko Haram ascendancy and its potential weakness/downfall. 

There is a natural assumption that Nigeria is the primary target of the armed rebellion. The spatial concentration of Boko Haram operations on the country’s NE periphery suggests another dimension. As aggregates, the North East proportion of population, economy and economic development is very low compared to Nigeria’s total. Few states and cities drive Nigeria’s economy and NE is not in the picture. Of course citizens’ right to life and property is sacrosanct and the state must protect them everywhere in the country. It is safe to suggest that apparent diminished contribution of the NE, its location and apparent sparseness of bordering communities of neighbouring countries present Boko Haram as a honey trap for Abuja’s attention. Then, why is Boko Haram successfully operating from an isolated space? I’ll return to it later.

It is the conclusion of this article that Nigeria is not the major threat of Boko Haram at least not in the current phase. Of course Nigeria has suffered most with highest civilian casualty which stems from Abuja's strategic weakness, maladministration and malfeasance. If various geographical and other variables are thrown into the mix, one is confronted with facts that deserve to be respected and reviewed accordingly with methodological clarity. If Lake Chad is used as proxy for Boko Haram’s base, this is used since the armed group is an international phenomenon targeting all littoral states, an informed picture is produced. See Map below. 

Boko Haram's Relative Proximity of Threat to National Capitals

There is no sign that Niger, Cameroun and Chad desire such distraction even with Paris imprimatur. Niger will be the least concerned for among other things she hosts a United State drone base in Niamey, few kilometres from Nigeria. Adding proximity to national capitals, proximity to strategic population concentrations and proximity to water resources helps to capture a unique picture. Only one national capital (Ndjamena Chad) falls within the range of serious/immediate threat of Boko Haram. See Chart below. Chad is the only country among the littoral states with commercial crude oil reserve in proximity exported through a pipeline via Cameroun. 

Relative Distance b/w Boko Haram activity space & Lake Chad Littoral State Capitals

Unsustainable Supply Chain

When geography is projected further, as stated earlier Boko Haram seem to be an entity on the limb of activities that still gains traction. From network analytical perspective, Boko Haram is operating in a contiguous area of weak (low density) economic interaction in 3 countries for reasons of de-priority of various governments, historical isolation and challenging climatic/vegetation conditions. This is Boko Haram activity space/catchment area is a No-Man’s Land.  See map below. It is also very clear that Boko Haram and or its strategy is not to be identified with the people. Popular support and public opinion is not its priority as is usually found with armed groups fighting for various causes aligned to universal ascribed values. 

Boko Haram's Catchment Area/Activity Space

With North Africa decimated and central Africa region seriously weakened, who is sustaining Boko Haram with sophisticated weapons, medical supplies, logistics support, communication/intelligence equipments, target selection strategies, transport carriers? One of the major aspects of media reporting from Nigeria side is the absence of captured equipments. Reports usually end with casualty figures, not of capture personnel and equipments.  Or is this information deliberately withheld by the armed forces? 

Boko Haram cannot operate in isolation with huge intellectual & technological support and massive real-time geographical strategical foundation. How do they choose or select targets? When and where do they attack and retreat after engagement? What is their modes of 'undetectable' transport? There are suggestions that Boko Haram’s operational space may be coterminous with possible commercial reserve of important minerals. No Africa state/government currently has the deep pocket, motivation, connections, resources and sophistication to sponsor Boko Haram in their preferred/allocated location. As an isolated group is an isolated space, only air drops will suffice to supplied coordinates at specific times/periods.  Evidence will surface later.

Boko Haram is in continued existence in the area due to resilience of its operatives, tangible rewards for the operatives and sustained support of its geopolitical sponsors including continued supply of sophisticated weapons, logistical support, equipments and provision of real-time (encrypted) communication/intelligence.

Territorial Trap

Hindsight is always handy. Over time is emerged that Boko Haram Nigeria’s operation is a phase for wider destabilisation of the region. While many analysts are fixated with national boundaries, Boko Haram’s strategy is a grand scheme where national boundaries are reconfigured into unique activity space (No-Man’s Land) to suite their operation. Another conundrum of Berlin Conference! See map below! This is the basis for transnational prong attacks at their own times of choice. For Boko Haram ideologues/strategists there are advantages. In the name of territorial integrity and sovereignty, cross border raids and retaliations against Boko Haram are diminished. It must be borne in mind that as a mobile professional force, pinpointing Boko Haram needs accurate intelligence. 

Boko Haram's Transnational Primary & Secondary Activity Spaces

Another advantage for Boko Haram is the mounting pressure on various national capitals to increase security footprint in response to threat levels far away from their capitals. All things being equal this will involve new investment, seeking new funding sources or foreign (military) aid, and employing new personnel to be trained in the art & theories of regressive counter-insurgency. 'Regressive' is used because within African context counter-insurgency strategies/policies are applied without consideration to unique national/domestic social, cultural, economic and historical links. They are applied across the board as score-settling mechanism for political and economic advantage by the ruling elite. 

 Nigeria Complexity and Ruse of Election

While Abuja moved against election date on Boko Haram ruse, there is no evidence that they’ll accomplish their goal. Boko Haram is not a standing army for starters and by the way though inexcusable, NE is ‘far away’. Thirdly, citizens feel diminished for the emergency nature of current policy and question its credibility at least in view of the dead and lost property.  Nevertheless it is obvious from the above that Abuja and most of Nigeria is not seriously threatened that even a non-response is a response, an infuriating one at Boko Haram. In a sense Boko Haram strategy is attention-seeking of which pragmatic ignorance over time by Abuja may reduce them to irrelevance over time. At what other cost?

Nigeria’s challenge is how to eliminate an armed group with no strategy for capturing/holding any of strategic assets, high values economic resources and strategic natural resources. The currency of mass murder by Boko Haram will last for a while and their raison d’ etre will gradually weaken and or their handler will wind down their operations. Recent reports of beheading alleged spies by Boko Haram may suggest encroaching pressure and potential internal rupture. Another important issue is the cost-benefit equilibrium for maintaining Boko Haram. Running it is an expensive project.

Even if circumstance favour current armed forces action, in isolation what will be termed success may involve destruction of rebel assets in high-visible locations and displacement of personnel to No-Man’s Land or to neighbouring countries especially Cameroun to Yaoundé’s displeasure & protest. Displaced Boko Haram personnel will cool off for a period of time; regain strength, energy and resources only to return again sometime after the election. Among the problem with this approach is how to collate the cost and justify its implementation to citizens in the background that for some elite it is a meal ticket.

Conclusion

Boko Haram phenomenon is a complex dimension of anti-state action. Data is suggesting that Nigeria may be a target with no serious threat but in the immediate phase a target of attention-seeking. Chad appears as the country most exposed to serious threat. Nevertheless there are possibilities that Nigeria’s election will come and go while Boko Haram’s existence may be part of a wider geopolitical calculation against the region. In any case it will dissolve by its sponsor’s designation when a credible result is confirmed. In the mean time, Nigeria’s approach may remain ambiguous and her standing in the region continues to shrink.